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JEREMY BENTHAM'S CODIFICATION PROPOSALS AND SOME
REMARKS ON THEIR PLACE IN HISTORY
For the sake of those interested in the codification of Anglo-
American law, this comment attempts at the outset to present a con-
cise summary of Bentham's ideas as to the form codified law should
take and how his codes would eliminate some defects of the common




Bentham was twenty-eight years old and had just published his
first work-a condemnation of Blackstone-when the Revolutionary
War broke out in the United States. His life spanned a period of struggle
and rebellion in America, France and England. His chief reaction to
the revolutionary times was to engage in assiduous planning for the
reconstruction of the legal system. Anglo-American law has gradually
assimilated many of Bentham's ideas and suggestions, and the con-
temporary common law attorney may find it difficult to look back
upon his writings without wondering why he discussed at such
length matters that appear elementary axioms of sound jurisprudence.
Bentham's work seems overburdened with the minutiae of arguments
against imagined adversaries.
In contrast to the previous discussion, it must be noted that some
of Bentham's most fundamental aims have not been achieved in the
nearly two centuries that have passed since their proposal. It was
Bentham's foremost wish, and most avidly pursued objective, to insti-
tute a completely codified system in both England and the United
States. It was his intent to make law so understandably clear that every
man would know it, would regulate his conduct by reference to it, and
would be able to represent himself in court without the aid of counsel.
Bentham hoped to eliminate judge-made common law so that law
would emanate wholly from the legislators. These aims have not pros-
pered in Anglo-American law, notwithstanding the painstaking work
of Bentham and subsequent proponents of codification.
Universal Applicability of the Codes
With only minor adaptations for variances in climate, geography,
beliefs and customs, Bentham believed that his plans for a codified
239
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legal system would be suitable for any country in the world., In. 1782
Bentham offered to codify the laws of India; 2 by 1822 he had issued
a standing offer to codify for any nation in need of a law-maker.3 Never
having set foot in the United States, he wrote to President Madison in
1811 offering his services for the codification of American law.4 Shortly
thereafter, he conveyed a similar letter to the governor of Pennsyl-
vania, and in 1815 sent a letter to the governor of each state offering to
codify its law. Nothing came of these efforts, but Bentham did have
strong influence on Edward Livingston, who met with some success
in codifying the law of Louisiana.5
Completeness of the Codes
Several codes existed in Europe before Bentham began writing
on the subject. Although lauding the benefits the Danish, Swedish,
Prussian and Sardinian codes had conferred on the people o those
nations, Bentham considered these earlier codes to be incomplete.
The legal system he envisioned would only be fully realized when all
law was codified. Thus, he wrote:
The collection of laws made upon this plan would be vast, but
this is no reason for omitting anything.... Besides, what part ought
to be excluded? To what obligation ought the citizens to be sub-
jected without their knowledge?
Whatever is not in the code of laws ought not to be law. Nothing
ought to be referred either to custom, or to foreign law, or to pre-
tended natural law, or to pretended law of nations .... 6
The concluding sentences of this passage reveal that it was fear
of the unknowability of the law that motivated Bentham to insist
upon the completeness of the codes. He specifically identified common
law methodology as the means by which the legal profession main-
tained a sinister monopoly over the knowledge of the law. Bentham
described this process in the following manner:
1. 13 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 76-77 (1952).
2. Vesey-FitzGerald, Bentham and the Indian Codes, in JEREmY BENTHAM AND
THE LAw 222 (G. Keeton ed. 1948).
3. 1 L. STEPHENS, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS 223 (1900).
4. 4 J. BOWRING, THE WORKS OF JEREMiy BENTHAm 453 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as WORKS].
5. Everett, Bentham in the United States of America, in JEREMy BENTHAMf AND
THE LAW 193 (G. Keeton & G. Schwarzenberger eds. 1948). See generally Franklin,
Concerning the Historic Importance of Edward Livingston, 11 TUL. L. REv. 163 (1936),
6. 3 WORKS 205.
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To warrant the individual decree which he is about to pronounce,
the judge comes out with some general proposition, saying, in words
or in effect, thus saith THE LAw. On the occasion of the issuing of
this sham law, the pretext always is, that it is but a copy of a proposi-
tion, equally general, delivered on some former occasion by some other
judge or train of successive judges.
7
In such pronouncements, Bentham added, "[t]here may be or may
not be a grain of truth."8 Hence, insofar as it was unwritten, Bentham
regarded the "law" as mere conjecture-a matter of the uncorroborated
opinion of the judge. Partial legislation or codification, Bentham recog-
nized, would not correct the problem so long as the judges retained
the power to interpret, and thereby corrupt, via common law method:
[W]hat alleviation soever the burthen of the law has ever received,
or can be made to receive . . .by successive patches of statute law,
applied to the immense and continually growing body of unwritten,
alias common law, is confined to the matter, leaving the form of it as
immeasurable, as incomprehensible, and consequently, as adverse to
certainty and cognoscibility as ever.. . . So long as there remains any
the smallest scrap of unwritten law unextirpated, it suffices to taint
with its own corruption,-whatsoever portion of statute law has ever
been, or can ever be, applied to it.9
Notwithstanding the acknowledged vastness of the undertaking,
it can hardly be said that codification failed in Bentham's time for lack
of requisite legal materials. In pursuit of completeness, Bentham had
worked out, by 1811, quite comprehensive preparations for a penal
code, a plan of judicial procedure, a plan of judicial establishment,
a code on evidence and a constitutional code.10 He was to continue
preparing for codification for the more than twenty years between
1811 and his death. The collection of his papers held by the University
College in London fills 173 portfolios of about 600 pages each.' 1 His
dedication to this task is testimony to the fact that by 1800 sufficient ma-
terials were available for a scientific treatment of law. Furthermore, it
should be noted that the French Civil Code appeared in 1803.
7. Id. at 223.
8. Id.
9. 4 WORKs 460.
10. Id. at 465.




The numerous drafts Bentham drew for his codes contained
changes in what he called the "matter" of the law, as well as in its
form. His plans for the laws of evidence and pleading, for example,
entirely revised and streamlined the existing rules on the subjects.
Similarly, in the area of contracts he would have stripped away the pre-
vailing chaos and rebuilt the law according to a few easily understood
principles:
Every obligation ought to be founded either on a precedent service
rendered by the person obligated; upon a superior need on the part
of him in whose favor the obligation is imposed; or upon a mutual
agreement which derives all its force from utility.12
Thus, the codes proposed by Bentham differ from our recent
"Restatements" not only in that they were to be the whole of the law
rather than simply another authority, but also because their content was
more than a distillation of prevailing statutes and court decisions.
Form and Cognoscibility
Bentham worked to make his codified law understandable and
enlightening. He reasoned that if the law were to guide the citizens'
conduct it must be present in their minds. Informing the citizens of
the law, or as Bentham put it, making the laws "cognoscible," would be
impossible unless both of two related goals were attained. First, the
law must be clear and simple enough for the "plain" man to be capable
of grasping it. Second, the law must be "promulgated" or made acces-
sible to the citizen. The first necessity concerns the internal structure
of the law, while the second involves bringing the body of the law into
juxtaposition with the populace. The two goals are interdependent. The
law cannot be brought to the citizen if it is not in written form or if it
is too voluminous to be read or distributed. Bentham realized that un-
less the law were made both internally logical and externally discover-
able, it could not possibly serve as a guide to human conduct. The
existing law illustrated for Bentham the gravity of the defect of the
incognoscibility of law.
Scarce any man has the means of knowing a twentieth part of
the laws he is bound by. Both sorts of law are kept most happily and
carefully from the knowledge of the people: statute law by its shape
12. J. BENTHA, , THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 90 (C. Ogden ed. 1931).
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and bulk; common law by its very essence. It is the judges . . . that
make the common law. Do you know how they make it? Just as a man
makes law for his dog. When your dog does anything you want to
break him of, you wait till he does it, and then beat him for it. This
is the way you make laws for your dog: and this is the way the
judges make law for you and me.13
Bentham's most important contributions resulted from his pur-
suit of internal consistency and simplicity in law, rather than from any
deep understanding of the social realities reflected in the legal processes.
He sought cognoscibility primarily through extensive analysis: every
word had to be made comprehensible to the plain man; technical
terms had to be carefully defined and then used consistently; interre-
lations of terms had to be expounded; obscurities, ambiguities, and
phrases in foreign languages could not be tolerated. As for legal fic-
tions, Bentham regarded them simply as lies.
14
Bentham consciously identified internal linguistic rigidity with
social stability, thereby anticipating modern views of the importance
of cultural and linguistic struggle:
Proportioned to the uncertainty attaching to the import of the
words employed upon legal subjects, will be the uncertainty of posses-
sion and expectation in regard to property in every shape, and also
the deficiency of political security against evil in every shape: propor-
tioned, therefore, to the fixity given to the import of those same words,
will be the degree of security for good in every shape.... Until, there-
fore, the nomenclature and language of law shall be improved, the
great end of good government cannot be fully attained.15
During his most mature years, Bentham wrote extensively on such
stylistic and grammatical problems as redundancy, longwindedness,
unsteadiness of expression, complexity, entanglement, and their re-
spective stylistic remedies.' 6 The emphasis on such analysis has con-
tinued, via John Austin, in Anglo-American law and philosophy.'7
Another point of form by which Bentham sought to facilitate edu-
cation or "promulgation" of the law was to divide the codified law into
various sub-codes "with which some one class or denomination of per-
sons only have concern." There could be, for example, particular sub-
13. 5 WORs 235.
14. C. OGDEN, BENTHAM'S THEORY OF FICTIONS xviii (1932).
15. 3 WoRxs 270-71.
16. 3 WORKs 231-83.
17. See, e.g., J. AUSTIN, TRE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832).
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codes for husband and wife, master and servant, etc.'8 To aid further
in their comprehension, the sub-codes were to be broken into sections
of moderate size, "of a length suited to the conceptive and retentive
powers of the description of persons for whose eye it is destined," and
the sections were to be given names and numbers for easy reference. 19
Bentham considered government by an inaccessible or "unpromul-
gated" law to be tyranny.20 If Bentham had prevailed, the codified law
would have become the most important and widely read of books. He
harbored certain schemes by which this might come about, such as
distributing simplified code books to particular classes of persons, read-
ing the general code in churches, and teaching the codes in schools. 2 '
Bentham also suggested that the appropriate laws be posted prominently
in the public market places, and that the laws concerning particular
kinds of commercial transactions be printed in the margins of the
paper forms used in the respective transactions. In general, Bentham
placed great faith in education to produce a virtuous, law-abiding citi-
zen who would minimize social conflict and suffering.
Legal Method
If the law could attain the degree of publicity and popularity
Bentham believed possible, then it was conceivable that every man
could represent himself in court. Where is the need for the legal spe-
cialist if the law is readily accessible to, and understood by, every
citizen? In addition, the population would benefit by ridding itself of
that self-serving class who so perverted truth and justice:
So far as concerns love of truth and justice, the greatest but at the
same time the most hopeless improvement would be, the raising of
the mind of the thorough-paced English lawyer, on a bench or under a
bench, to a level with that of an average man... whose mind had not,
for professional views and purposes, been poisoned with the study
of the law .... 22
Bentham believed that judges also had a vested interest in the prevailing
injustice which they perpetuated through the arbitrariness of common
law method.23
18. 4 WORKS 454.
19. 3 WORKs 250.
20. 6 WORKS 519.
21. 5 WORKS 236.
22. 7 WORKS 188.
23. 2 WORKS 11.
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As a solution, Bentham proposed that power be taken from the
hands of the judges and lawyers and transferred to the legislators.
Limiting all law to the code would reduce the need for judicial law-
making and for reliance on specialized practitioners. Further, Bentham
emphasized that in judging whether a given case falls within the
law, the text of the law should be the sole authority or standard. If
ambiguity exists' in the text, the legislature itself should resolve it.
Enactments must no longer be entirely abandoned to the "interpreta-
tion" of the judges:
Whatsoever the legislator had in view and intended to express, but
failed to express, either through haste or inaccuracy of language, so
much it belongs to the judges in the way of interpretation to supply.
When, however, a passage appears to be obscure, let it be cleared
up rather by alteration than by comment. Retrench, add, substitute
as much as you -will-but never explain: by the latter, certainty will
generally,-perspicuity and brevity will always, suffer.
2 4
Even the fact that a particular case had not been foreseen by the legis-
lators would not be sufficient reason for a judge to intervene and make
the law.
If a new case occur, not provided for by the code, the judge may
point it out, and indicate the remedy: but no decision of any judge,
much less the opinion of any individual, should be allowed to be cited
as law, until such decision or opinion have been embodied by the
legislator in the code.
2 5
Would not the -number of cases unforeseen by the legislator be
so numerous as to make such a system unworkable? Is not there always
a need for "interstitial" lawmaking, as Cardozo phrased it?26 In the
face of such queries Bentham maintained that although not every par-
ticular case can be foreseen, every species of case is foreseeable. 2T At
times he seemed to believe that the categories for the legal codes could
be worked out once and for all with no need for development. In this
respect, his thinking paralleled the mechanist outlook according to
which all future events are in principle deducible from the present posi-
tion and velocity of atoms. Bentham neglected the dialectical move-
ment which necessitates change in both the form and the content of
.24. 3' WORxs 210;
25. Id.
'26. B. OAno6zo' THE NATURE OF THE JUbICAL PROCESS 113-14 (1960).
27. 3 WORKS .205.
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the legal superstructure. 28 Nevertheless, his proposals on legal method
are noteworthy as an early attempt to overcome the virtual despotism
exercised by Anglo-American judges through common law method.
Bentham saw that, ironically, the common law judges' ameliorations
in the content of English law can come about only by means of un-
just acts of "arbitrary power," since common law by its very form is
ex post facto law.29 In insisting that the text of the code be the basis for




In his critique of English law, Bentham became the first Anglo-
American to discuss law as method and form, as distinguished from
pure content. His attention to analysis, consistency, and other logical
features of law did not totally preclude him from viewing the law as
a concrete administrative process carried on in the affairs of real men.
He saw that if the organization of the legal process was such that the
judges or lawyers had arbitrary power over the outcomes of the cases,
the law would be unjust no matter how irreproachable its principles
might have been when considered in the abstract. Previous thinkers
tended to see law only as a set of rules or pronouncements or formula-
tions-that is, as content-and largely ignored questions as to how the
rules functioned in actual administration.
Despite these steps towards greater realism, Bentham in fact cor-
rupted materialistic legal theory in the form it had taken under Hol-
bach, Helvdtius, Beccaria, and others of the French Enlightenment."0
Among these theorists, natural law was consistently viewed as possessing
28. F. ENGELS, ANTI-DUHRING 37 (1947).
29. 4 WORKS 460.
30. Bentham borrowed from Beccaria the utility principle and the idea that all
human action springs from the expectations of, or reactions to, pleasures and pains.
Beccaria, Of Crimes and Punishments, in THE COLUMN OF INFAMY 6 (1964). See also
11 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 575-77.
Both Beccaria and Helvtius believed that social conflict resulting from pursuits
of self-interest could be resolved through legislation. Id. at 41, 42, 46.
Holbach believed that through comprehending the objective laws of nature, in-
cluding human nature, man could achieve social happiness. P. HOLBACH, NATURe. AND
HER LAWS: As APPLICABLE TO THE HAPPINESS OF MAN LIVING IN SOCIETY (J. Watson
transl. 1834). Bentham's philosophy subjectivised the thought of these men and re-
treated from their insistence that science could treat-and cure-all social ills.
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an objective, material existence. In the attempt to obviate the need
for God in the explanation of natural phenomena, these writers intro-
duced mechanistic causation. Thus, active human perception and un-
derstanding were conceived as a reasoning faculty passively informed by
the natural world.31 Bentham seized upon this weakness to erect him-
self as the champion of active, empirical legal science. He advanced
the famous utility principle-the balancing of pleasure against pain-
as the standard by which to evaluate "scientifically" the propriety of
legal and moral actions.
32
Whereas Enlightenment materialism could foresee the eventual
solution of all social problems through science, Bentham believed the
immiserization of the masses inevitable and permanent.3 3 Hence,
Bentham could not envision the withering away of the state as could
his contemporary, Robert Owen.34 Bentham stayed clear of the Jacobi-
nism and incipient socialism which had received intellectual inspira-
tion from French sources and had become popular in England after
1800.
According to Bentham, the law must remain, albeit in a radically
improved form. One need not look far in his work to discover that
the law's permanence is necessitated by the desired permanence of
private property. Bentham says at one point:
It is surprising that so judicious a writer as Beccaria should have
inserted, in a work of the soundest philosophy, a doubt subversive of
the social order. The right of property, says he, is a terrible right and
may perhaps not be necessary. Upon this right tyrannical and san-
guinary laws have been founded. It has been most frightfully abused;
but the right itself presents only ideas of pleasures, of abundance,
and of security.-m
31. K. Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in TuE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 121-23 (C. Arthur
ed. 1970). Thesis I is of special pertinence.
32. On the fraudulent nature of this posturing, see text at note 43 infra.
33. Perfect happiness belongs to the imaginary regions of philosophy, and
must be classed with the universal elixir and the philosopher's stone ....
[Tihere will always be opposition of interests, and, consequently, rivalries and
hatred . . . . Painful labour, daily subjection, a condition nearly allied to
indigence will always be the lot of numbers .... [R]eciprocal security can
only be- established by the forcible renunciation by each one, of every thing
that would wound the legitimate rights of others. If we suppose, therefore,
the most reasonable of laws, constraint will be their basis ....
1 WoRKs 194.
34. See, e.g., W. SAROANT, ROBERT OWEN, AND His SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY- (1860).
35. 1 WORKS 309.
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Security, a virtue Bentham held practically synonymous with private
property, was of such supreme importance to him that he believed
even equality must submit to it in case of conflict. He justified this
ordering of priorities with an early form of "trickle-down" theory.86
All this does not mean that Bentham was among the most reac-
tionary forces of English society. He appreciated the gains that had been
made in the English, American and French revolutions, and his codifi-
cation proposals were aimed at the worst corruption of the aristocracy
and established bankers.
Popular Attitudes Towards the Legal System
As an erudite spokesman of the middle class, Bentham was able
to achieve a certain degree of influence through his writings, even
though Parliament was generally unreceptive to his ideas. The senti-
ments of the majority of English society, towards the legal system, how-
ever, have left their mark on history only by means of the direct action
people took on particular issues. 37 Many members of this sub-political
majority were actually living outside the law, or in a fringe area.
Colloquial terms of the period convey some idea of conditions. Besides
the common thieves and prostitutes there were "receivers of stolen
36.
When the question is to correct a kind of civil inequality, such as slavery,
it is necessary to pay the same attention to the rights of property; to submit
it to a slow operation, and to advance toward the subordinate object without
sacrificing the principal object. Men who are rendered free by these gradations,
will be much more capable of being so than if you had taught them to tread
justice under foot for the sake of introducing a new social order.
It is worthy of remark that in a nation prosperous in its agriculture, its
manufactures, and its commerce, there is a continual progress towards
equality ....
Thus we may conclude that Security, while preserving its place as the
supreme principle, leads indirectly to Equality; while equality, if taken as the
basis of social arrangement, will destroy both itself and security at the same
time.
J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 122-23 (C. Ogden transl. 1914).
37. The 18th and 19th century are punctuated by riot occasioned by bread
prices, turnpikes and tolls, excise, 'rescue', strikes, new machinery, enclosures,
press-gangs and a score of other grievances. Direct action on particular grievances
merges on the one hand into the great political risings of the 'mob'-the Wilkes
agitation of the 1760s and 1770s, the Gordon Riots (1780), the mobbing of the
king in the London streets (1795 and 1820), the Bristol Riots (1831), and the
Birmingham Bull Ring Riots (1839). On the other hand it merges with organized
forms of sustained illegal action of quasi-insurrection-Luddism (1811-13), the
East-Anglican Riots (1816), and the "Last Labourer's Revolt" (1830), the Re-
becca Riots (1839 and 1842) and the Plug Riots (1842).
E. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 62 (1963). See also
13 HOL SWORTH, supra note 1, at 201.
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property, coiners, gamblers, lottery agents, cheating shopkeepers, river-
side scroungers, ... Mudlarks, Scuffiehunters, Bludgeon Men, Morocco
Men, Flash Coachmen, Grubbers, Bear Baiters, and Strolling
Minstrels."38
Since the most trivial offenses were often punishable by hanging,
it is easy to imagine that among those oppressed "[t]he law was hated
[and] ... despised." 39 But extreme animosity towards the law was not
limited to the criminals and quasi-criminals during this era:
Highwaymen and pirates belonged to popular ballads, part heroic
myth, part admonition to the young. But other crimes were actively
condoned by whole communities-coining, poaching, the evasion of
taxes ... or excise or the press-gang....
. This distinction between the legal code and the unwritten code
is a commonplace at any time. But rarely have the two codes been
more sharply distinguished from each other than in the second half of
the 18th century.
40
Although he may have been unwilling to admit it, Bentham's re-
formist legal views undoubtedly drew support from the activity of the
working class. His attacks on the judges and the legal profession grew
stronger as working class agitation mounted in the latter part of his
career. Had Parliament not granted broad legal and political reforms
in 1832, the year of Bentham's death, it is highly probable that civil
war would have broken out.
4 '
Bentham's Legal Philosophy
Bentham criticized the natural law theory of his contemporaries
for its tendency to offer deeply felt beliefs where proofs were required.
He' thought that he had found a much more objective or scientific
ground for legal decisions in pleasures, pains and happiness:
What happiness is everyone knows, because what pleasure is every-
iian knows, and what pain is everyman knows. But what [natural]
justice is, this on every occasion is the subject matter of dispute.42
.1
38. E. TH omPsoN, supra note 37, at 55.
3: Id. at 61.
40. Id. at 59-60.
41. 13 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 242; E. THoMPSON,.supra note 37, at
808- -2.
, : 42. P. King, Utilitarian Jurisprudence in America 25-26, (unpublished thesis, in
University of Illinois Library).
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Nevertheless, while Bentham's legislator is apparently committed
to a wholly factual, empirical task in adding pleasures and pains and
calculating happiness, the firm, factual data turn to quicksand or en-
tirely vanish on closer exmaination. How can qualitatively different
pleasures be weighed against one another? How can one man's pleasure
be weighed against another's pain? How could one person even de-
termine another's degree of happiness, pleasure or pain since, accord-
ing to Bentham, pleasures and pains might well be totally subjective,
private events inaccessible to other persons?
In spite of an attempt to avoid deciding whether there is any ulti-
mate difference between what is mental and what is material, Bentham
asserted that in practice a distinction must be made between the mental
and the material. 43 In practice, then, the legislator may find that people's
pleasures and pains are mental, subjective, and private and therefore
unavailable to him. As a result, the legislator may have resort only to
his own estimate of what is the public's pleasure. For example, does it
really maximize the pleasure of the whole public to favor security
(i.e., private property) over equality, or is this merely the conjecture
of the legislator? It is clear that Bentham's legislator was not neces-
sarily the objective, scientific decisionmaker for whom Bentham seemed
to be calling, and hence that Bentham's legal philosophy did not in fact
differ much from the natural law he condemned.
CONCLUSION
Bentham was of middle class orgins, and he believed that the pros-
perity and growth of the middle class should be encouraged. His rela-
tion to Enlightenment materialism and to the socialist thought of his
era is best explained as a part of the unusually reactionary role played
by the English middle class in the early nineteenth century:
The example of the French Revolution had initiated three simultane-
ous processes: a panic-struck counter-revolutionary response on the
43. Those who maintain that the mind and body are one substance, may
here object, that upon that supposition the distinction between frame of mind
and frame of body is but nominal, and that accordingly there is no such
thing as a frame of mind as distinct from the frame of body. But granting, for
argument's sake, the antecedent, we may dispute the consequence. For if the
mind be but a part of the body, it is at any rate of a nature very different
from the other parts of the body.
J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEOISLATION 176
n.2 (W. Harrison ed. 1948). Thus, in rejecting the mechanistic materialism of the En-
lightenment, Bentham apparently retreats to a Cartesian dualism.
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part of the landed and commercial aristocracy; a withdrawal on the
part of the industrial bourgeoisie... and a rapid radicalisation of the
popular reform movement. . . . The twenty-five years after 1795
may be seen as the years of the "long counter-revolution"; and in con-
sequence the Radical movement remained largely working-class in
character, with an advanced democratic "populism" as its theory.
But the triumph of such a movement was scarcely to be welcomed by
the mill-owners, iron-masters, and manufacturers. Hence the peculiarly
repressive and anti-egalitarian ideology of the English middle classes
(Godwin giving way to Bentham, Bentham giving way to Malthus,
M'Culloch, and Dr. Ure...).44
His middle class position explains Bentham's excoriating the judges
for their flaunting of arbitrary power while believing that the reign
of the legislator would be totally objective even though guided only by
his princple of utility.
Bentham clearly gave less support to working class activism than
he received from it. His most unguarded and vituperative attacks on
the legal profession came in his later years when the working class had
become most insistent and had finally moved England out of the long
period of reactionism following the French Revolution. Only in these
years did he dare to advocate liberalization of voting requirements.4 ,
Despite his conservatism and firmly bourgeois position, Bentham's
codification proposals were regularly shunned in England and the
United States as too radical. After his death, the rising industrial
bourgeoisie began to draw upon some of his more palatable ideas.
Later, Rudolf von Ihering, and then Roscoe Pound, reworked
Bentham's subjectivistic interest theory into more sophisticated forms,
which eventually found theii way into recent Supreme Court decisions.
4 6
TERRY DiFxipo
44. E. THOMPSON, supra note 37, at 807-08.
45. J. STOCKS, JEREMY BENTHAM (1933). This book neatly delineates Bentham's
shift to a more liberal position in his later years.
46. R. IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (S. Husik transl. 1913); 3 R.
POUND, JURISPRUDENCE (1959). The latter is devoted to Pound's theory of interest. A
crude version of Pound's interest theory has been used in many recent Supreme Court
decisions. E.g., Bibb v. Navaho Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959); Southern
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775-76 (1945).

